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ABOUT THIS PAPER
The global Covid-19 pandemic has required unprecedented government action at 
an unprecedented pace. It is vital that policymakers act to slow the spread of the 
virus, protect people's livelihoods and ensure the economic recovery delivers both 
prosperity and justice for the long term. 
This discussion paper has been commissioned to provide rapid analysis and 
expertise to the UK government with this goal in mind and will be followed by 
further analysis and recommendations from IPPR.
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KEY MESSAGES
• Responding to the Covid–19 crisis requires increased public spending  
and borrowing.
• We present an interactive tool to explore the implications for the public 
finances under a range of assumptions about the effect of the lockdown  
on economic growth.
• We show that public debt remains manageable across a range of possible 
scenarios. Therefore, it is possible to continue to bolster the economy with 
support schemes for workers and a broad-based post-lockdown stimulus.
• We explain that an important driver of debt sustainability is the very low 
interest rate on government debt. Even if this were to rise, it would take 
sufficiently long to feed through to higher debt servicing costs that interest 
payments should remain manageable.
• The public needs to be prepared for very different outcomes than those  
forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) and the Bank of England,  
in particular the likelihood of ‘scarring’ effects from the lockdown preventing a  
full economic ‘bounceback’ (a ‘V-shaped recession’) when the lockdown is lifted.
• We highlight the uncertainty around our forecasts using fan charts, instead  
of single line projections. This allows us to show a range of possible outcomes 
for growth, the deficit, and public debt under each set of assumptions.
INTRODUCTION
The Covid–19 crisis will have a significant impact on the public finances. Higher 
unemployment, reduced tax revenue and substantial government spending  
on schemes to support the economy will lead to higher government deficits. 
Already there are calls for a return to austerity once the most acute phase of the 
medical emergency has passed. Others instead propose that we accept higher 
levels of public debt. It can be difficult for citizens to take a position on these 
debates: many may feel that they don’t have the necessary understanding or 
technical knowledge.
Forecasts of the public debt and deficit play an important role in framing these 
debates. Media headlines give the impression that higher public debt presents 
an immediate danger to the financial security of the average citizen. This limits 
the ability of voters to question their government’s policies on the basis of an 
informed position on the likely costs and benefits of alternative strategies. 
This paper considers the implications of the Covid–19 crisis for the UK public 
finances. We present an interactive forecasting tool for the public sector deficit  
and debt which has been designed to meet the following objectives.
1. It should produce plausible probability forecasts of the public finances.
2. It should remain accessible to non-specialists.
This tool is hosted online so that anyone interested in the public finances,  
and their implications for government policy, can use it. To illustrate its use, this 
paper presents forecasts for two possible scenarios: a short lockdown, as in 
the ‘coronavirus reference scenario’ recently published by the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR 2020b), and a longer lockdown with ‘scarring’ effects as a result  
of job losses and bankruptcies. 
The forecasting tool is based on the OBR database and reference scenario, and 
differs mainly in the assumptions made about likely GDP growth. In addition, 
the forecasts are presented as ranges of possible outcomes rather than single 
projections, with the extent of these ranges based on historical volatility.
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The paper concludes by considering the policy implications of the short and long 
lockdown forecasts. Under our expected time paths for the public debt, and given 
the recent historical behaviour of interest rates, we do not consider there to be 
any need for a return to the spending cuts of the Osborne and Hammond years. 
With sensible taxation policies in place, public debt, even at higher levels following 
the coronavirus outbreak, is likely to remain manageable. 
While the model’s forecasts are rigorous enough for use in policy planning, a key 
purpose of the model is educational: by experimenting with different options and 
assumptions, users will gain an intuitive feel for the dynamics of the public sector 
deficit and debt.
CORONAVIRUS, PUBLIC DEBT AND FORECASTING
Public sector debt rose from less than 40 per cent of GDP to over 80 per cent of 
GDP as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, with the figure passing 140 per cent 
if bank nationalisations are taken into account. Fiscal austerity, ostensibly in 
response to the danger posed by this debt, became a permanent feature of the 
political landscape after 2010. The necessity of spending cuts went unchallenged 
by the majority of economic commentators at the time, with disagreement largely 
limited to questions of scale and speed. The outcome was one of the worst 
economic recoveries on record: for a decade, productivity and wages stagnated, 
growth in employment was dependent on expansion of low-paid, precarious work, 
and previously positive trends on poverty and health went into reverse (Marmot 
et al 2020, CEJ 2018). The profound weaknesses caused by a decade of austerity 
are thrown starkly into relief by the Covid–19 crisis. Those on lower incomes, those 
suffering from worse health, and those in more precarious financial situations are 
bearing the brunt of both the medical crisis and the economic crisis.
Austerity in 2010 was not inevitable, but the lack of dissenting voices in the media 
and public discourse gave the impression that there was no room for debate. This 
lack of dissenting opinion was compounded by a culture of ‘black box’ modelling 
in academic and public sector economics, in which a small number of influential 
forecasts added legitimacy – and a sense of inevitability – to policy decisions 
taken by the Coalition government (Wren-Lewis 2015).
This paper, and the web tool that accompanies it, aim to demystify the process 
of forecasting the public finances. A small number of institutions specialise in 
producing such forecasts, and most use ‘black box’ models. Unless the reader has  
a specialist training in macroeconomic modelling, it is very difficult to understand 
the official documentation of the OBR macroeconomic model, for example. Even 
for those with training, reproducing the computer model and interacting with it 
can be challenging. In contrast, our web tool produces plausible and rigorous  
fiscal forecasts, but is simple enough for non-experts to use.
Today’s crisis is more severe, and the human cost greater, than the 2008 financial 
crisis. The secondary economic effects are likely to be at least as important as  
the initial shock: a recent Ipsos MORI poll suggests that over half of the public  
will feel uncomfortable going to bars and restaurants after the lockdown is 
lifted, while prominent figures from the most-affected sectors are warning that 
business could take years to recover (Ipsos MORI 2020, King 2020). A sharp rise in 
unemployment is inevitable – and the rise will be substantially larger if government 
support measures are withdrawn prematurely.
The scale of public borrowing and the consequent increases in public debt will 
almost certainly surpass those seen after 2008. Debate has already started on 
how the government should respond to rising deficits: while some argue for higher 
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taxation, or for allowing debt levels to rise, there are already calls for a return to 
austerity in the form of government spending cuts when the immediate danger 
from the virus has passed. Debate was recently sparked by the leak of a Treasury 
document containing warnings of a ‘sovereign debt crisis’ caused by increased 
borrowing due to the coronavirus crisis (Wren-Lewis 2020).
This is the context in which forecasts of the public finances from organisations 
such as the OBR enter the public debate. These forecasts, and the commentary 
they generate, are powerful tools for legitimising or challenging fiscal policy 
decisions. It is therefore vitally important that citizens understand the basics of 
the public finances, the manner in which they are forecast, and the implications 
of these forecasts. A healthy democracy requires a public that can question the 
policies of its government. 
The OBR is the UK's ‘fiscal watchdog’: a public sector organisation tasked with 
producing macroeconomic forecasts and analysis of the public finances. Its 
projections are widely used and cited in the media. Twice a year, alongside 
the budget and the chancellor’s autumn statement, the OBR releases detailed 
projections of the UK economy and public finances. These provide an official 
benchmark against which government fiscal policy is judged, and are reported 
extensively in the national media.
The ‘coronavirus reference scenario’ published in April 2020 by the OBR therefore 
attracted substantial attention. This was not one of the scheduled twice-yearly 
forecasts, but an update to the forecast presented a month earlier on 11 March.
A striking feature of this scenario is that, with the exception of unemployment 
and the public finances, the economic effect of the coronavirus is predicted to 
be almost entirely transitory. Once past the two-year period at the start of the 
scenario, the projections align almost exactly with those presented alongside  
the budget in March, before the lockdown was announced and the likely scale  
of the economic and financial impact of the coronavirus was understood.
The accompanying documentation points out that the scenario is ‘not a forecast’ and 
notes the substantial uncertainty surrounding the economic effects of the coronavirus 
and the form and timing of the strategy to exit from lockdown. Notwithstanding 
these uncertainties, the OBR opted to present a ‘reference scenario’ that shows 
how an assumed three-month lockdown will affect the public finances.
Despite the caveats added by the OBR, it is difficult to understand the basis of a 
projection that shows no persistent effects of Covid–19 on the UK economy. The 
OBR scenario assumes, on the basis of a plausible accounting exercise, that real 
GDP will fall by 35 per cent in the second quarter of 2020, mostly due to labour 
shortages resulting from the lockdown. However, despite projected unemployment 
increasing from below 4 per cent to over 10 per cent, the OBR assumes that the 
economic collapse will entirely reverse over the subsequent two quarters, so that 
GDP fully recovers to pre-crisis levels by the final quarter of 2020.1
But the economy is not like a spring that will simply recoil once restrictions are 
lifted. During the lockdown period, household balance sheets are deteriorating, 
workers are being laid off and firms are going bankrupt. While government 
measures to support households and businesses have been significant, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that these are not sufficient to prevent lasting damage 
to the economy. It is highly unlikely that the economy will fully recover from the 
shock of the coronavirus within six months. The longer the lockdown and social 
distancing measures last, the more severe the damage will be, and the longer the 
resulting economic effects will last.
1 The Bank of England’s ‘ illustrative economic scenario’ forecasts a similar ‘V-shaped’ recession (Bank of 
England 2020)
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MODELLING THE CORONAVIRUS SHOCK
As economists forecasting the public finances, we are interested in the trajectories 
of the public sector deficit, the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio, and related statistics 
such as annual interest payments on the debt. These numbers are widely reported 
in the press, often with limited contextualisation, and are the focus of sustained 
and heated political debate.
In this paper, we use historical data on GDP, government spending and taxation, 
some key accounting relationships, and a small number of plausible assumptions 
about the future path of GDP to produce forecasts of the effect of the Covid–19 
crisis on public finances. We use the macroflow model to produce these forecasts.2
Users can interact with the model by making different assumptions about the length 
of the lockdown, the extent to which the economy ‘bounces back’ when the lockdown 
is lifted, and the degree of long-run damage suffered by the economy during the 
lockdown. Users can observe in real time how these assumptions affect forecasts of 
public debt and the deficit. The model is designed to produce plausible probability 
forecasts of the public finances while remaining accessible to non-specialists.
A forecast can be thought of as a subjective probability distribution over a set of 
possible futures. In simpler terms, this means that a forecast is a list of possible 
outcomes with probabilities attached to each. So, for example, in meteorology one 
might forecast a ‘50 per cent probability of rain in three days’ time’, or ‘less than 
a 5 per cent probability of snow in April’. These forecasts are based on previous 
historical experience – eg the observed frequency of snowfall in April – and anything 
else known about the process being forecast. Crucially, forecasting in economics is 
rarely a purely mechanical process, and the majority of macroeconomic forecasts 
are mediated by the judgement of the forecaster.
The projections in this paper take the OBR’s ‘coronavirus reference scenario’ as a 
baseline, but alter key assumptions to produce new forecasts.3 The OBR dataset 
and projections used in the macroflow model are summarised in table 1.
2 A public web interface to the model can be accessed here: macroflow.org/forecasts/uk/2020-05-corona/
3 Data and projections for the OBR coronavirus reference scenario are available at https://obr.uk/
coronavirus-analysis/.
TABLE 1: OBR REFERENCE SCENARIO DATA AND PROJECTIONS
Outturn OBR reference scenario
2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 2022/23 2023/24 2024/25
Public sector tax receipts (£bn) 813 839 743 902 946 981 1,019
Total managed expenditure (£bn) 851 887 1,016 978 1,008 1,041 1,077
Public sector net borrowing (£bn) 38 47 273 76 63 61 59
Public sector net debt (£bn) 1,774 1,799 2,203 2,285 2,359 2,428 2,291
Debt-to-GDP ratio (%) 81.8 80.9 112.0 95.4 95.2 94.8 86.3
Nominal GDP (£bn) 2,167 2,223 1,966 2,394 2,478 2,562 2,654
Nominal GDP growth (%) 3.9 2.6 -11.6 21.8 3.5 3.4 3.6
Source: OBR (2020b)
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All variables in the table correspond to the public sector financial year (ie April 
to March).4 The historical data and forecasts are all presented in nominal terms, 
ie they are expressed as a sterling value without adjusting for inflation. Public 
sector net borrowing in each year (the deficit) is equal to expenditure less taxation. 
Public sector net debt increases each year by an amount equal to the deficit plus 
an additional ‘non-borrowing adjustment’ which is not shown in the table, but can 
be inferred by comparing the cumulated deficit with the public debt series. Non-
borrowing adjustments include things like bank nationalisations, privatisations and 
some lending by the Bank of England to the private sector.
The steps taken by the macroflow model to forecast the public finances can be 
summarised as follows.
1. Allow the user to select the length of the lockdown. This input determines  
GDP growth in 2020/21 and the time path of government expenditure.
2. Allow the user to specify what they think GDP growth will be in 2021/22 – ie 
the ‘rebound’ – and what they think growth will be in 2022/23, 2023/24 and 
2024/25.
3. Given these user inputs, compute the implied tax receipts, public deficit-to-
GDP ratio, and debt-to-GDP ratio based on a small number of pre-specified 
parameters.
The model presents forecasts of nominal GDP growth, the level of nominal GDP,  
the deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio alongside brief explanations. For a three 
month lockdown we follow the OBR GDP and government expenditure figures, 
while for longer lockdown forecasts we assume that each additional month of 
lockdown reduces GDP growth in 2020/21 by a further percentage point and 
increases government expenditure by £15 billion. The latter figure is in line with  
the OBR scenario, and effectively assumes that the current policy package will  
be maintained throughout each additional month of lockdown.
There are four options for the lockdown length, four options for the growth rate  
in 2021/22, and four options for the medium-term growth rate. Users can therefore 
generate 64 separate trajectories for the public finances, and experimenting with 
the different combinations should allow them to gain an intuitive understanding of 
how the dynamics of the public finances are determined. The technical details of 
the model are discussed in box 1, and the pre-specified parameters are discussed 
in box 2. 
4 The first four rows can be found in table 1.5 and the fifth row in table 1.10 of the OBR commentary 
document, and the final two rows are calculated from the rows above.
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BOX 1: TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MACROFLOW MODEL
The macroflow model uses the OBR data in table 1. Given a lockdown policy 
and two further user-specified inputs, it computes probability distributions 
for the major public sector finance aggregates from 2019/20 to 2024/25 
using the following algorithm:
1. The user chooses a three-month, six-month, nine-month or twelve-
month lockdown policy. The three-month policy implies a government 
expenditure trajectory similar to the OBR trajectory in table 1, and an 
expected 2020/21 GDP growth rate equal to -12 per cent, which is similar 
to the OBR growth rate in table 1. Each additional month of lockdown is 
assumed to reduce expected growth by 1 percentage point and increase 
government expenditure in 2020/21 by £15 billion.
2. The user specifies a value for expected nominal GDP growth in  
2021/22 – ie what they expect the ‘rebound’ to look like – and a  
value for expected nominal GDP growth in 2022/23, 2023/24 and 
2024/25 – ie what they expect medium-term growth to be.
3. Using these inputs, the model simulates n hypothetical trajectories  
for nominal GDP under the assumption that GDP growth is  
normally distributed.
4. Using the n simulated trajectories for nominal GDP growth, the model 
simulates n hypothetical trajectories for nominal tax receipts under the 
assumption that tax receipts are linearly related to GDP.
5. Using the n simulated trajectories for tax receipts and nominal GDP, 
alongside the fixed trajectory for government expenditure, the model 
computes n hypothetical trajectories for the public sector finances 
using accounting identities. Specifically, the public sector deficit is 
calculated using the following accounting identity:
The public sector net debt is calculated using the following  
accounting identity:
where non-borrowing adjustments are inferred from the OBR reference 
scenario and are mainly due to the Term Funding Scheme (TFS) for 
SMEs. This is a Bank of England scheme that offers funding for private 
banks at interest rates at, or close to, the bank rate, with more funding 
available to private banks that expand lending to SMEs. The loans to 
private banks made by the Bank of England under the TFS are financed  
by issuing reserves, and as the loans are classified as ‘ illiquid assets’ 
they do not net out against the debts incurred. Hence public sector  
net debt increases by the amount of reserve creation. 
This method for forecast generation is relatively unconstrained by a formal 
model. In fact, other than the accounting identities and assumptions over the 
lockdown policies, the only imposed relationships are the parameterisation 
of the normal distributions for GDP growth and the linear relationship 
between taxation and nominal GDP. These are explained in box 2.
DEFICITt = EXPENDITUREt – TAXATIONt 
DEBTt = DEBTt-1 + DEFICITt + ADJUSTMENTSt
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BOX 2: PARAMETERISATION OF THE MACROFLOW MODEL
As discussed in box 1, the macroflow model requires the user to choose 
between a set of lockdown policies and specify two expected GDP growth 
figures. Aside from this, there are a small number of parameterisations that 
the user cannot change. 
First, the expected value for GDP growth in 2019/20 is fixed at 2.6 per cent, 
which is the same as in the OBR’s reference scenario.
Second, the standard deviation of nominal GDP growth is equal to its post-
1997 sample standard deviation of 1.73 percentage points each year, other 
than in 2019/20 in which it is quartered, and in 2020/21 and 2021/22 in which 
it is doubled. This reflects the greater certainty we have about growth in 
2019, and the greater uncertainty we have about the impact of Covid–19.
Third, nominal tax growth is assumed to be equal to nominal GDP growth plus 
a normally distributed white noise shock. In fact, if we examine a scatter plot 
of nominal tax growth against nominal GDP growth from 1948/49 to 2018/19, 
we can see that the relationship is strong, linear and almost one-for-one. If 
we regress tax growth against GDP growth, we obtain an intercept estimate 
of 0.0007 and a slope estimate of 0.9631, and the p-value for an F-test of the 
joint hypothesis that the intercept equals zero and the slope equals one  
is 0.77. 
FIGURE B1: SCATTER DIAGRAM OF TAX GROWTH AND GDP GROWTH, 1948/49–2018/19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OBR (2020a), authors' calculations
Finally, a Shapiro-Wilk normality test on the residuals from the 
unconstrained regression yields a p-value of 0.82 – ie we cannot reject 
normality at a reasonable significance level. Thus, we assume that tax 
growth is equal to nominal GDP growth plus a normally distributed shock, 
for which we set the standard deviation equal to the post-1997 standard 
deviation of the residuals from the constrained regression, which is 
approximately 1.8 percentage points.
To illustrate the use of the model, we present forecasts for two scenarios: a 
three month lockdown scenario with medium-term growth equal to its pre-crisis 
average, and a six month lockdown scenario with medium-term growth one 
percentage point lower than its pre-crisis average. Following the prime minister’s 
address to the nation on 10 May, it is becoming clear that the lockdown will last 
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shorter lockdown, as restrictions are likely to be lifted progressively over the 
summer, so a lockdown that lasts between three and six months will imply deficit 
and debt forecasts that lie somewhere between the three and six month forecasts 
discussed here. A three month scenario also allows us to highlight the differences 
between our forecasts and those of the OBR. Much will depend on whether the 
current policy package is in fact replicated for the length of the lockdown, and  
how employers respond when the furlough scheme is pared back. 
SCENARIO 1: THREE-MONTH LOCKDOWN
Figure 1 presents the macroflow forecasts for a three month lockdown. The blue 
dashed line is the median of our forecast distribution – according to the model, 
there is a 50 per cent probability that an indicator will lie above this line in any 
given year, and a 50 per cent probability that an indicator will lie below this line 
in any given year. The grey dashed line shows the OBR reference scenario. The 
uncertainty bands in figure 1 correspond to the 1st and 99th percentiles (lightest 
band), 5th and 95th percentiles (intermediate band), and 20th and 80th percentiles 
(darkest band). The way to interpret these is as follows: based on our assumptions, 
the economic indicators are more likely to remain within the darker bands than 
the lighter bands. There is a 1 per cent chance that any given indicator will have a 
value greater than the top of the lightest band in any given year, and there is a 1 
per cent chance that any given indicator will have a value less than the bottom of 
the lightest band in any given year. Likewise, there is a 5 per cent chance that any 
given indicator will be below the intermediate band, and a 5 per cent chance it 
will be above it. There is, therefore, a 98 per cent chance that any indicator will be 
within the range shown by the lightest band, a 90 per cent chance it will be within 
the intermediate band, and a 60 per cent chance it will be within the darkest band.
FIGURE 1: NOMINAL GDP, NET BORROWING AND NET DEBT FORECASTS, SCENARIO 1
Source: OBR (2020a, 2020b), Macroflow model
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The central forecast of nominal GDP growth in 2020/21, represented by the blue 
dashed line, is equal to -12 per cent. This is approximately equal to the immediate 
hit to nominal GDP in the OBR reference scenario: this is plausible and is justified 
by the accounting exercise in the commentary accompanying the OBR scenario. 
It is also consistent with the forecasts of real GDP growth in the recent reports, 
Doing more of what it takes from the Resolution Foundation, and Prospects for the 
UK economy from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (Hughes 
et al 2020, Lenoël et al 2020). However, since the economic effects of the Covid–19 
crisis and the accompanying lockdown measures are highly uncertain, the colour 
bands around the median forecast are wide. For example, the intermediate colour 
band in the GDP growth panel shows a forecast range of approximately -6 per cent 
to -18 per cent in 2020/21: this represents our view that under a short lockdown 
scenario, there is a 90 per cent chance that GDP will contract by between 6 per 
cent and 18 per cent this year. 
The OBR assumes that GDP returns to its pre-crisis trajectory during the current 
financial year, resulting in a 2021/22 nominal growth rate of just over 20 per cent. 
In common with several other commentators, we do not consider this to be a 
plausible central forecast (eg Jacobs, 2020) – the Treasury are reported to be 
preparing for a 'U-shaped' recovery (Rayner and Mikhailova 2020). 
As such, in our three month lockdown scenario we expect the 2021/22 nominal 
growth rate to be closer to 10 per cent, again with a high level of uncertainty. This 
implies that medium-term nominal GDP is forecast to be around 10 per cent lower 
than its pre-crisis trajectory, which is a similar level effect to that seen after the 2008 
crisis. In this scenario, nominal GDP growth from 2022/23 onwards is projected to 
return to the rate predicted by the OBR of approximately 3.5 per cent, and nominal 
GDP is expected to return to its pre-crisis level by some point in 2023.
In our three-month scenario, the OBR reference scenario emerges as a ‘best-case 
scenario’, since it lies within the lightest of our probability bands. This result is 
driven by our assumption that the 2021/22 economic rebound will be around half 
the size of the rebound in the OBR reference scenario.
In our scenario, the government is expected to borrow around £200 billion a 
year more than is suggested by the OBR reference scenario by 2024/25. This is 
because tax receipts are forecast to be lower than in the OBR scenario because 
GDP is lower, while the government expenditure trajectory is the same as in the 
OBR reference scenario. This is a very simple way to approach the problem of 
deficit forecasting, because we rely in large part on the OBR projections and do 
not separate government expenditure into its various components (eg current 
and capital spending, interest payments on debt etc). Its purpose, however, is to 
illustrate the government’s policy problem for the user in a very straightforward 
way: GDP is expected to fall, therefore tax receipts are expected to fall, therefore 
the deficit is expected to rise conditional on the government’s planned 
expenditure remaining constant.
As the deficit increases, so too does the government debt. As a percentage of GDP, 
debt is expected to rise to around 120 per cent by 2023/24, which is driven by the 
increase in the deficit, the fall in nominal GDP, and an additional increase of around 
£130 billion as a result of the Bank of England’s Term Funding Scheme for SMEs 
and valuation changes caused by quantitative easing. The debt is then forecast to 
fall back slightly as a percentage of GDP in 2024/25 as the Term Funding Scheme 
loans are paid back – this assumption (and the associated numbers) follow the OBR 
reference scenario. Again, however, there is significant uncertainty surrounding 
these numbers. If the lockdown does in fact last three months, our assumptions 
suggest that a plausible 98 per cent interval forecast for the debt-to-GDP ratio by 
the end of the current financial year is between 100 per cent and 130 per cent.
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SCENARIO 2: SIX-MONTH LOCKDOWN AND 
‘SUPER-HYSTERESIS’
Figure 2 presents forecasts in which the lockdown is assumed to last six months 
and the medium-term growth rate falls as a consequence of economic ‘scarring’ 
– an effect known in the literature as ‘super-hysteresis’.5 We assume that each 
additional month of lockdown decreases the 2020/21 expected nominal GDP 
growth rate by one percentage point, so moving from a three month to a six month 
lockdown reduces expected growth from -12 per cent to -15 per cent. This is a more 
muted response than the Resolution Foundation’s projection of a 20 per cent fall 
in real GDP following a six-month lockdown, but their figure is consistent with  
our forecast distribution as the uncertainty surrounding 2020/21 growth is high.  
We retain the assumption of a 10 per cent rebound in 2021/22, so the immediate 
post-crisis level of nominal GDP is lower in scenario 2 than in scenario 1.6
FIGURE 2: NOMINAL GDP, NET BORROWING AND NET DEBT FORECASTS, SCENARIO 2
Source: OBR (2020a, 2020b), Macroflow model
In this scenario, nominal growth in 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 is equal to 2.5 per 
cent, which is just over one percentage point lower than the 2010–2019 average. This 
is a similar decrease in the growth rate to that observed after the 2008 financial 
crisis, when nominal growth fell from a 1997–2007 average of around 5 per cent 
to the 2010–2019 average of around 3.7 per cent. This type of ‘super-hysteresis’, 
in which the growth rate of economic activity is permanently reduced following a 
recession, is associated with falls in productivity driven by the crisis. The reasons for 
5 ‘Hysteresis’ refers to a return to the previous growth rate at a lower level of GDP, while ‘super-hysteresis’ 
refers to both a lower level of GDP and a lower growth rate.
6 Note that the six-month lockdown does not need to be interpreted as a continuous full lockdown: three 
months of full lockdown followed by another six months of looser social distancing measures could have 
similar effects on GDP, as could two separate episodes of three months of full lockdown within the year.
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the dramatic fall in UK productivity growth after the 2008 financial crisis are subject 
to ongoing debate, and a consensus has not yet emerged. Despite this, and in 
recognition of the empirical evidence, we give users the option to choose a  
degree of ‘super-hysteresis’ which is similar to the effect seen after 2008.
In this scenario, the expected public debt-to-GDP ratio rises to more than 130 per 
cent, and it appears highly likely that the public sector debt will remain above 100 
per cent of GDP until 2024/25. The major driver of this result is the larger fall in 
2020/21 nominal GDP resulting from the longer lockdown, and therefore the larger 
level effects on nominal GDP and taxation compared to scenario 1, rather than 
the reduction in the subsequent growth rate. This is easy for the user to see when 
experimenting with the parameters, and again illustrates the government’s policy 
problem in a simple manner. The peak debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 130 per 
cent is similar to the Resolution Foundation’s expected peak following a six-month 
lockdown, but occurs later given the lower medium-term growth rate.
As already emphasised, both of the scenarios above are subject to substantial 
uncertainty. One major factor contributing to this uncertainty, above and beyond 
Covid–19, is the UK’s yet to be completed withdrawal from the European Union. 
With a mismanaged and disorderly Brexit at the end of 2020, the prospects for  
GDP growth would be significantly worsened. 
IS HIGHER PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABLE?
In the scenarios discussed above, public sector net debt is expected to peak at 
approximately 120 per cent of GDP in the case of a three-month lockdown, and 
approximately 135 per cent of GDP in the case of a six-month lockdown with 
‘super-hysteresis’. The policy implications of these figures depend on the future 
path of interest rates, because the effect of public debt on the public finances 
depends on the percentage of tax revenue required to service that debt.
At the end of April 2020, market yields on gilts – bonds issued by the UK Treasury 
– were well below 1 per cent across the maturity spectrum. Figure 3 plots the 
average yield on gilts issued between the 1998/99 and 2017/18 financial years,  
and the effective interest rate paid on the public sector net debt between the 
same years. The effective interest rate is simply the total cash value of the  
interest payments made by public sector organisations to bondholders divided  
by the sterling value of the public sector net debt; in figure 3 this is presented 
gross and net of the effects of quantitative easing (ie gross and net of the ‘asset 
purchase facility’ (APF) which is the subsidiary of the Bank of England used to 
purchase government bonds).
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FIGURE 3: EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE ON THE PUBLIC DEBT AND AVERAGE GILT YIELDS AT 
ISSUANCE, 1998/99–2017/18
Source: ONS (2020), OBR (2020a), DMO (no date), authors' calculations
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the effective interest rate paid on the public debt 
was above the average yield of gilt issuance. This is because the government funds 
part of its debt by issuing long-dated gilts – ie gilts that pay fixed interest rates for 
15 or more years – so when interest rates are falling the yield on newly issued gilts 
is lower than the yield on the average gilt. This describes the situation prior to the 
financial crisis, in which the 10-year benchmark rate fell steadily from the early 
1990s onwards. Between 2007/08 and 2009/10, when the public debt rose from  
£545 billion to £997 billion, the effective interest rate fell to a level that was much 
closer to the yield on newly issued gilts. This happened for the simple reason 
that almost half of the outstanding debt as of March 2010 had been issued in the 
previous two years.7
The average maturity of outstanding gilts is around 16 years, with the average 
maturity on index-linked gilts higher and the average maturity on conventional 
gilts slightly lower.8 Given this, figure 3 implies that a significant part of the 
outstanding gilt portfolio was issued at yields above 2 per cent. If market yields 
stay below 2 per cent, therefore, these gilts will be refinanced at a lower rate. As 
gilts issued to fund current and post-crisis deficits will be issued at less than 2  
per cent, and the refinancing of gilts issued before the crisis will involve a 
reduction in their rates, we would expect the effective interest rate on the public 
sector net debt to fall further over the medium-term. This situation is similar to 
re-mortgaging at the end of a fixed-term mortgage during which interest rates 
have fallen.
If, on the other hand, average market yields rise to 2 per cent in the near future, 
we would expect the effective interest rate on the public debt to stabilise near 
its current level. Under our three month lockdown scenario, in which debt-to-
GDP is expected to peak at around 120 per cent of GDP, an effective interest rate 
7 The public sector net debt data are taken from the OBR’s April 2020 PSF databank, and the public  
sector interest payments data are taken from the ONS (codes JW2P and MU74). The average yield on 
issued gilts are from the Debt Management Office, see: https://dmo.gov.uk/data/gilt-market/average-gilt-
issuance-yields/.
8 The interest rate on index-linked gilts adjusts to compensate for inflation. The majority of gilts 
outstanding are not index-linked, so the rate of interest remains fixed regardless of changes in inflation.
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of 2.5 per cent implies interest payments of around 3 per cent of GDP and 8 per 
cent of tax revenue, because tax receipts as a share of GDP should remain close 
to their current value of 37.5 per cent. Under our six month lockdown scenario, 
in which debt-to-GDP is expected to peak at around 135 per cent of GDP, a 2.5 
per cent effective interest rate on the public debt implies that interest payments 
would increase to around 9 per cent of tax revenue. However, these are likely to 
be overestimates, because the part of the public debt accounted for by the TFS 
for SMEs is financed at bank rate, we have not taken into account the recently 
announced extension to quantitative easing, and it seems reasonable to suppose 
that the Bank of England would extend its asset purchases further if yields rose 
significantly in the absence of inflation.9
Finally, if market yields were to rise to a materially higher level than they are 
today – perhaps due to some form of sustained inflationary shock – then the 
effective interest rate on the public debt would take some time to rise. This would 
be a situation opposite to that which existed prior to 2008, as the yield on newly 
issued gilts would be higher than the yield on the average gilt. In this case, all of 
the gilts issued after 2011 at average yields of around 2 per cent would take some 
time to refinance at higher rates. As shown in figure 4, in normal times gross debt 
issuance is around 10 per cent of the total stock in any given year, of which around 
half constitutes the refinancing of existing debt and half funds new borrowing.10 
Therefore, in the event that market yields do rise significantly in the medium-
term – and we consider the probability of this happening to be low – the effective 
interest rate on the public debt will take some time to catch up. Using the mortgage 
analogy again, higher interest rates will not have an effect until the end of the 
fixed-term period is reached.
FIGURE 4: GROSS AND NET ISSUANCE OF GILTS, 1998/99–2017/18
Source: OBR (2020a), DMO (no date), authors' calculations
Overall, there is little evidence to suggest a clear and present danger to UK citizens 
from elevated debt-to-GDP ratios. Calls for immediate spending cuts should 
therefore be resisted: the economic and social cost of cuts in government 
9 For discussion, see Michell and Toporowski (2019).
10 These data are also from the Debt Management Office, see: https://www.dmo.gov.uk/data/gilt-market/gross-
and-net-issuance-data/
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programmes and reductions in state capacity would greatly exceed the benefits 
of risk reduction due to lower deficits. Over the medium term, however, it makes 
sense to ensure that public finances are on a sustainable footing by reducing 
the deficit through progressive taxation, including taxation of wealth. Given that 
government spending as a share of GDP will almost certainly need to rise, due to 
the effects of an ageing population, aiming for a higher tax share in GDP should 
be a medium-term policy goal. Tax rises should be calibrated in such a way as to 
minimise their effect in dampening aggregate demand: increases in VAT should  
be avoided, for example.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In this paper we have presented a forecasting tool that can be used to produce 
plausible probability forecasts for the public finances using a method which is 
transparent and easy to understand. Under a three month lockdown scenario, 
the model implies an expected peak debt-to-GDP ratio of around 120 per cent 
of GDP, which rises to more than 130 per cent in a six-month lockdown scenario 
with ‘scarring’ effects on medium-term growth. These central forecasts are highly 
uncertain, however, and the web interface quantifies this uncertainty by using  
fan charts.
Whether or not these ‘scarring’ effects on medium-term growth materialise, it is 
important for the public to understand that scenarios from institutions such as 
the OBR and the Bank of England of a short lockdown followed by an immediate 
‘V-shaped’ economic rebound are implausible. It is highly unlikely that the 
economy will fully recover from the shock of the coronavirus within six months,  
and the longer the shutdown and social distancing measures last, the more  
severe the damage will be. At the time of writing, recent announcements from  
the prime minister and chancellor suggest that a number of measures will be  
in place until at least the autumn.
Government policies to mitigate the economic effects of the crisis should, 
therefore, remain in place for some time and arguably should be strengthened. 
Once the most acute phase of the crisis has passed, the heightened debt levels 
resulting from sustained deficits and a deep recession do not imply the need for a 
return to the spending cuts of the Osborne and Hammond years. In the medium-
term the public finances appear to be manageable, as judged by the likely future 
path of interest payments, suggesting that an equitable approach to the public 
finances after Covid–19 would be to stabilise the public finances at somewhere 
close to their post-crisis level. In the immediate future, increases in progressive 
taxation could be used to finance the rebuilding of social security and the welfare 
state after 10 years of austerity, and more substantial tax rises on those at the 
upper end of the income and wealth distributions could be used to finance higher 
post-crisis debt ratios.
We do not, however, impose these policy conclusions on users of the model 
presented in this paper: it is designed as much as a tool for public education as  
a policymaking guide. Importantly, while the underlying data is taken from the OBR, 
and the forecasts are broadly consistent with those of other reputable institutions 
such as the Resolution Foundation and National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, our model allows the user to change the forecasting assumptions and 
observe the effects in real time. A healthy democracy requires a public that can 
question government policy. This is not possible without sustained efforts at public 
education: opening the ‘black box’ of public debt forecasts is a small step in  
this direction.
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